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Abstract In this chapter, we offer a critique of the growing use of virtual worlds for chil-
dren, particularly as tools to teach children the basic elements of storytelling: language, 
narrative, the creative imagination, and generativity in applying learned skills. We argue 
that virtual storytelling is not like other forms of storytelling, particularly for children, 
who are still developing these abilities. There is evidence that digital storytelling through 
virtual worlds lacks many of the positive aspects of non-digital storytelling, and may even 
inhibit the development of imagination in children. In this chapter, we review the litera-
ture on children and virtual worlds, focusing on the importance and development of the 
creative imagination in children. We discuss the visualization hypothesis – a theory that 
was developed to explain how television produces a reductive effect on the imagination 
because it presents the user with ready-made visual images – and generalize it to new 
media, including virtual worlds. We posit the ‘displacement hypothesis’, which states that 
when manufactured content is supplied ready-made to the individual, then it displaces 
the creative and imaginative processes that the individual would otherwise supply for 
him or herself. The more immersive the medium, the more psychological dimensions are 
captured by this displacement – such as sound, the visual, narrative content, time, space, 
physical presence – the more reductive are the effects on the individual’s imagination. We 
conclude that further research is needed in order to determine the long-term effects of 
virtual worlds on child development, and that in the meantime virtual worlds are an inap-
propriate medium for children’s storytelling.
Introduction
Virtual worlds – games in which the user interacts with a persistent digital envi-
ronment through a self-representation known as an “avatar” (Hew and Cheung, 
2010: 34) – are a unique form of digital storytelling. Unlike ordinary games, virtual 
worlds are highly immersive, and create the impression that the user has a good 
deal of control over their interactions with their virtual environment. Therefore, 
it might appear at first glance that virtual worlds can become an important tool 
for children’s storytelling, for engaging and teaching children skills in language, 
constructing narratives, and developing imagination. Indeed, virtual worlds have 
begun to be used in this manner, even for pre- and primary school-aged children 
(ibid.). Some scholars, such as Bitarello (2008: 2), argue that virtual worlds have 
long existed in literature, art, and mythology, and they view virtual worlds as 
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merely an extension of these non-digital forms of storytelling. In this chapter, 
we challenge this view of virtual worlds, focusing on the negative effects that 
virtual worlds can have on the development of the creative imagination in young 
children, and thus on their ability to learn the complexities of language and narra-
tive – the essentials of storytelling. We argue that there is a fundamental difference 
between non-virtual storytelling that seeks to ignite the imagination, and virtual 
storytelling, which can limit and oppress the development of the imagination in 
young children. 
The research on non-digital storytelling shows that it enhances children’s im-
agination (Raines and Isbell, 1994: 264–265), supports and extends children’s 
social lives (Britsch, 1992: 80), further develops their cognitive skills (such as 
“deferred imitation”, speculation and knowledge) and contributes significantly to 
all aspects of language development (Cooper et al., 1992: 10–11). There may be a 
temptation, therefore, to assume that digital storytelling through virtual worlds 
can be similarly effective in teaching young children. While some authors argue 
to the contrary (Miller, 2008: 189–227; Lundby, 2008: 1–21), we argue that digital 
storytelling through virtual worlds not only lacks these positive aspects, especially 
with respect to the imagination, but may actually suppress them.
Many of the negative effects that virtual worlds have on the development of 
the imagination are caused precisely by the characteristic that makes their use 
in education seem attractive: their degree of immersion, which is a heightened 
sense of interactivity between the user and the virtual environment. We refer to 
this as a ‘sense’ or ‘appearance’ of interactivity, because it actually masks the fact 
that the user remains bound by the rules of the game, while it draws the user in 
to a greater degree than do ordinary games. As Sanchez-Vives & Slater (2005) 
remind us, “[t]he degree of immersion is an objective property of a system that, 
in principle, can be measured independently of the experience that it engenders” 
(p. 333). There are therefore possible avenues for testing the level of immersion 
that a virtual world engenders, and thereupon to also test for its effects upon the 
user. We posit that virtual worlds can harm the normal development of imagina-
tion in children by the fact that it displaces true make-believe play, while pretend-
ing to provide it. Not only does this displace the benefits of make-believe play, but 
it distorts children’s developing sense perceptions and negatively impacts their 
ability to tell reality from fantasy; the imagination and the creativity it engenders 
is thus stunted, while rule-based and sensory-motor thinking predominate. Thus, 
storytelling through virtual worlds is in direct conflict with the main goals of sto-
rytelling itself. This heightened degree of immersion can also give rise to many of 
the ill effects produced by the use of virtual worlds, including Internet Addiction 
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Disorder (IAD) and Pathological Internet Use (PIU) (Hilarie et al., 2012: 292–298; 
Kuss et al., 2014: 27). Moreover, the context of storytelling emphasizes the funda-
mental difference between non-virtual storytelling that seeks to ignite and foster 
the imagination, and virtual storytelling, which can displace, distort, and limit 
children’s developing imagination. This chapter will open with a discussion and 
review of the literature on virtual worlds, particularly those that target children, 
and will discuss potential harms to the development of children’s imagination 
through their interactions with virtual worlds. Next, we review the literature on 
the development of imagination in children and the empirical research concern-
ing the impact of artificial media on this development. We conclude that virtual 
worlds are an inappropriate medium for children’s storytelling.
Virtual Worlds
A virtual world is an artificial environment created by computer software that 
enables users to interact with other users and with the software itself using self-
representational figures called avatars (Hew and Cheung, 2010: 34). Communica-
tion can be performed through text, graphics, avatar movements, gestures and 
sounds (Wadley and Benda, 2007). The user logs onto the internet to a server 
hosting the software creating the virtual world. This software introduces the user 
to perceptive stimuli and the user can manipulate objects in the presented envi-
ronment, thereby experiencing a certain degree of virtual presence. These virtual 
worlds can look similar to the real world or to a fantasy world – a world in which 
the rules of nature are different than the rules of the real world and the characters 
in it are not known in reality (Hunter, 2003: 443).
In her book, Reality is Broken: Why Games Make Us Better and How They Can 
Change the World, Jane McGonigal (2011) illustrates the staggering influence of 
virtual worlds on our lives: 
[I]f you add up all the hours that gamers across the globe have spent playing World 
of Warcraft since the massively multiplayer online (MMO) role-playing game (RPG) 
first launched in 2004, you get a grand total of just over 50 billion collective hours – or 
5.93 million years. To put that number in perspective: 5.93 million years ago is almost 
exactly the moment in history that our earliest human ancestors first stood upright. 
(McGonigal 2011: 52)
McGonigal concludes that we have therefore spent as much time playing World 
of Warcraft (WoW) as we have spent evolving as a species (ibid.).
Virtual worlds, as a result of their high degree of immersion, are often very 
good at drawing players in for long periods of time, and this is an important source 
of the revenue they are able to generate. World of Warcraft reaps an estimated 
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$100 million every single month (Superdata, 2013). McGonigal points out that 
“no other computer game has ever made so much money keeping so many players 
occupied for so long. Each WoW player spends on average between seventeen 
and twenty-two hours per week in the virtual world, more time than any other 
computer game attracts” (ibid.).
Children’s virtual worlds are not far behind in their abilities to generate large 
revenues. Research suggests that children are using electronic media at younger 
ages (Rideout et al., 2003), and news reports indicate that children as young as 
three are participating in virtual worlds (Chmielewski et al., 2008). There are 
over 400 virtual worlds designed and targeted specifically to children (Smolen, 
2012; Kzero, 2013). According to some estimates, virtual worlds garnered over 
one billion users in 2010, roughly half of whom were under fifteen years old, with 
219 million users being between the ages of 5 and 11 years old (Watters, 2010). 
One popular virtual world for children is Webkinz. Dellinger-Pate and Conforti 
(2010) describe Webkinz as an all-encompassing experience, stating that
[Webkinz] is not merely a mode of children’s entertainment, a beloved stuffed toy, a profit-
driven phenomenon, an educational tool, a source of family negotiation, an aggressive 
marketing device, a source of addiction, or a comment on cultural values. It is all of them. 
(Dellinger-Pate and Conforti 2010: 252)
This description illustrates the growing influence exerted by virtual worlds on 
children’s early experiences. There is no standard definition or description for 
children’s experience in virtual worlds. However, most of the major brands in the 
market are based around a mix of social interaction and casual game-play. One 
classic example is Club Penguin. 
In Club Penguin, children sign up as registered users and take on the form of pen-
guin avatars. They then go to a fantasy world called Penguin Island where they can 
play games, customize their characters and talk to other children’s penguin avatars. 
Chat is moderated to ensure that there is no kind of anti-social behavior. Registered 
users of Club Penguin, typically aged 6–12 with a slight skew towards girls, can get a 
basic entertainment experience for free. If they want the complete experience, they 
have to pay a subscription fee of $6–8 per month (Club Penguin, 2015). 
Club Penguin’s headline statistics indicate that the site has 175 million registered 
users in 190 countries, up from around 12 million at the time of its 2007 purchase 
by Disney for $350 million (Eldon, 2007). This indicates strong growth, but per-
haps more important is the number of children who choose to pay for premium 
access. Disney is coy, but analysts estimate this is around 5–10% of registered users 
(White, 2012). If these estimates are correct, then Disney may be generating as 
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much as $122.5 million per month from subscription fees alone, which indicates 
the extremely large profits to be made from children’s virtual worlds.
Two key differences that separate virtual worlds from other video games are 
that virtual worlds are both persistent and dynamic (Lastowka and Hunter, 2004: 
5–6). This means that even when the player is not in the virtual world, the virtual 
environment continues to exist and change over time (Rogers 2008: 407; Cas-
tronova, 2005: 80). Virtual worlds’ heightened sense of interactivity is another 
important difference between video games and virtual worlds. Jenkins (2009) 
states that “[v]ideo games like Zelda, Halo, or Harry Potter allow players to enter 
into an environment and interact with objects, but they don’t allow the player to 
create an environment and that’s what virtual worlds are all about.” But it is pre-
cisely their persistence, dynamism, and heightened sense of interactivity that we 
argue lead to the ill effects of virtual worlds. Dellinger-Pate and Conforti (2010) 
illustrate the potential harmful influence on children through the following story:
She [the author’s colleague] and her family were traveling for Christmas and unable to get 
to a computer easily when her son wanted to play on Webkinz. When her son was finally 
able to log on he became instantly panicked and cried uncontrollably over the fear that 
his pet was dying. He saw that his beloved avatar was very ill and in the hospital due to 
malnutrition. The mother knew the pet was, indeed, not going to die; the website makes 
that clear to parents in its introduction. Yet her son was distraught over having neglected 
his poor pet during the Christmas season. He vowed never to let that many days go by 
without caring for the animal’s needs. (Ibid: 267)
This story illustrates the child’s inability to distinguish between the virtual nature 
of the Webkinz pet and reality. His perception of the virtual world’s persistence is 
derived from his experience in the real world. He reacts normally to an abnormal 
environment. However, this is to the child’s detriment, and to the website opera-
tor’s financial benefit. 
There are those who argue that the growing number of virtual worlds geared 
toward young children is a benefit, one that can “provide young learners with 
experiences that scaffold skills needed for community building and civic engage-
ment” (Berson et al., 2009: 28), while interconnecting with people and issues they 
confront in real life (Wang, 2010: 32). One broad-based review of the literature 
showed that virtual worlds can have a positive impact in creating communicative 
spaces for remote users, as well as in assisting experiential skills learning, although 
this study focused on older children and adult learners (Hew and Cheung, 2010: 
45–47). Another study found that virtual worlds had a positive impact on primary 
students’ achievement and motivation in learning geography facts (Tüzün et al., 
2009: 75–76).
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Others disagree, citing evidence of the negative effects of virtual worlds on 
child development. Many of these critiques point to the narratives embedded in 
the virtual worlds themselves and demonstrate their harmful effects on children. 
For example, Marsh (2010: 30) states that while virtual worlds are a space in 
which children can engage in make-believe and narrative-related play, this is im-
peded by the ways in which virtual worlds restrict children’s choices (ibid.: 35-6). 
Similarly, Hannaford (2012: 17) found that children engaged imaginatively with 
one another and the virtual environment, and that they took the narratives they 
learned there back with them into the outside world. Both Marsh and Hannaford 
discuss children’s imagination and make-believe play in terms of identity practice, 
and so one might be tempted to conclude from their work that if we constructed 
better and more inclusive narratives for children in their virtual worlds, then this 
problem might be overcome. 
However, the problems go deeper than the narrative content and are often 
embedded in the structure of the game itself. Dellinger-Pate and Conforti’s (2010) 
study of Webkinz led them to conclude that the game harms children’s developing 
communication skills and social connectivity. They state, “there is no scenario 
where cooperation between players takes place. There is no true community in 
this playground. Although the site visuals offer the illusion of community (a vil-
lage with shops and friendly, furry characters waving to each other, with open, 
green fields to run and play in), they are fleeting images and never experienced 
by the player” (p. 264). Grimes (2015a: 120) has also found that the narratives in 
children’s virtual worlds promote consumer culture. Children are instructed to 
acquire and display items and to construct social hierarchies based on acquisition 
(where restrictions based upon a lack of funds are taught as “fair play”). Respect-
ing copyright and other corporate rules are embedded in the structure of the game 
itself (ibid.), as is the practice of “immersive advertising,” which “enables interac-
tive and deeply embedded forms of product placement” (ibid.: 122). Even more 
invisible are the ways in which children are co-opted into performing forms of 
immaterial labor, such as data mining and market research, but also less tangible 
forms of labor (ibid.: 126). After all, it is the participation of the children them-
selves in the game that actually constructs the virtual environment, and it is their 
interactions with and emotional connection to the game that lend it its meaning, 
its cultural value and, ultimately, its immense monetary value as well (ibid.).
Grimes (2015b: 136) concludes that virtual worlds provide very limited op-
portunities for children to exercise their imagination in make-believe play, since 
adults ultimately shape and impose an idealized play environment on the child. 
She states:
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By restricting opportunities for children to create their own UGC [user-generated con-
tent], reappropriate branded content, or even speak freely about the commercial content 
encountered, these worlds have excluded some of the most potentially valuable dimen-
sions of children’s play. (ibid.: 142)
Plowman (2004: 221) found that when their own imagination exceeded the func-
tionality of a “smart” toy, children quickly became unhappy and preferred to play 
with the toy switched off. We conclude that, even if adults could design “suitable” 
narrative content into the virtual world, its use would continue to have harmful 
effects on children’s developing imagination. The virtual worlds would continue 
to displace children’s true imaginative interaction with adult-generated rules 
and constructs – ones whose weaknesses cannot easily be discerned or simply 
switched off.
The Imagination
The essence of imagination lies in its generativity, in the fact that through our 
imagination we can conjure up experiences and representations that are wholly 
novel to our lived experiences. Imagination is critical to children’s mental develop-
ment and abilities to learn, as we discuss further below. Despite its importance, it 
remains intangible and difficult to define. Cohen & MacKeith (1991) described 
psychologists’ ambivalence towards it, stating that “on the one hand, it fascinates. 
Just as no other species can speak, no other species can imagine or invent. On the 
other hand, it is extremely hard to study imagination – especially experimentally” 
(ibid.: 11–14).
Despite this ambivalence, there have been numerous attempts to define and 
classify the imagination, none of which have yet received widespread consensus. 
Vygotsky (1978) defined imagination as “a new formation which is not present 
in the consciousness of the very young child, is totally absent in animals and 
represents a specifically human form of conscious activity. Like all functions of 
consciousness, it originally arises from action” (ibid.: 537). One can imagine, for 
example, a bird turning into a snake while flying over a lake without ever having 
seen such a transformation actually taking place. One can produce novel repre-
sentations in the mind by generatively combining past perceived representations. 
Elaborating on this definition, Singer & Singer (2005) define imagination as a
form of human thought characterized by the ability of the individual to reproduce im-
ages or concepts originally derived from the basic senses, but now reflected in one’s 
consciousness as memories, fantasies, or future plans. These sensory-derived images, 
‘pictures in the mind’s eye’, mental conversations, or remembered or anticipated smells, 
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touches, tastes, or movements can be reshaped and recombined into new images or pos-
sible future dialogues. (Ibid.: 16)
The emphasis is on the “images or concepts originally derived from the basic 
senses” that are then “reshaped and recombined”. But this raises the question of 
whether “images or concepts” that are artificially mediated – and which are usually 
the product of the imaginary process of a TV show or video game creator – will 
function in the same way as basic building blocks for the user’s imagination.
Other authors have defined the imagination in the context of the human spirit. 
For Watkins (1990: 75), the imagination is “the intermediate universe – the uni-
verse between pure spirit and the physical, sensible world – which is the world of 
the symbol and of imagining”. According to Latham (2003: 91), “[i]maginative 
capacity thus underpins our species’ ability to make sense and guide us beyond 
ego-directed aims and conditions that life brings our way. Creative fantasy freely 
expressed is our key to balance and wholeness”. Dubos (1965: 7) argued that 
“[m]an’s propensity to imagine what does not yet exist, including what will never 
come to pass … most clearly differentiates him from animals. The more human 
he is, the more intensely do his anticipations of the future affect the character of 
his responses to the forces of the present”. The imagination bridges the time from 
the present to the future.
Ulanov and Ulanov (1991) point out that there is no life of the spirit without 
imagination. “Properly understood and pursued,” they state, “the imagination is 
perhaps our most reliable way of bringing the world of the unconscious into some 
degree of consciousness and our best means of corresponding with the graces 
offered us in the life of the spirit” (ibid.: 3). In our spiritual lives, the imagination 
enables paths that cannot be traveled in any other way, and its absence detaches us 
from the unconscious and the spirit. This is in stark contrast to the superficial and 
artificial representations of children’s virtual worlds, with their flat and fleeting im-
ages, a world in which everything is offered, but nothing can truly be experienced. 
A more prosaic definition of the imagination claims that imagination is an 
activity of the human brain, operating much like memory or logic or any other 
cognitive process (Misson, 2000). In this view, there is nothing mystical about the 
imagination: it is simply working on the material present in the brain (Feldman 
et al., 1994: 47). The critical character of the imagination lies in its generative and 
transformative abilities, to take existing ingredients and bring them together to 
generate something novel. It is perhaps for this reason that imagination is critical 
to learning. As Egan (1990: 166) states, “all learning that is to be of educational 
value seems necessarily to involve an imaginative-finite creative component. The 
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imagination is the making, composing, vivifying power that is required if the 
student is to reconstitute codes into living knowledge”.
Generally, imagination has not been studied as a single concept. Valkenburg 
and van der Voort (1994: 316–317), in a review of the research on the influence 
of TV on daydreaming and creative imagination, found three closely related but 
distinguishable imaginal processes, which they define as follows: imaginative 
play – play in which children transcend the constraints of reality by acting “as if ”; 
daydreaming – a state of consciousness characterized by a shift of attention from 
external stimuli to internal thoughts and images; and creative imagination, which 
is defined as the capacity to generate many different novel or unusual ideas (Valk-
enburg and Calvert, 2012: 158). This chapter will not deal with daydreaming, 
being outside the scope of this discussion, but it will discuss below imaginative 
play, the creative imagination, and the negative effects of media on the imagina-
tion as expressed in dreams.
Virtual worlds differ in many ways from authentic imaginary experiences, and 
these differences may actually impede the development of imagination in young 
children. According to Cobb, the psychological distance between the self and the 
object of desire “is the locus in which the ecology of imagination in childhood 
has its origin” (ibid.: 56). In virtual worlds, the distance between “the self and the 
object of desire” is vague since the self is portrayed as a virtual avatar; the object 
of desire is always at hand in the virtual environment but cannot be reached in 
the real one. 
Scholars have defined four key characteristics of children’s imaginary worlds: 
first, the child must be able to distinguish between what they have imagined and 
what is real; second, the child’s interest in the fantasy world persists for months or 
years; third, the child will be proud of the world and consistent about it; lastly, the 
child will feel that the world matters to him or her (these worlds usually disappear 
by the age of ten) (Cohen and MacKeith, 1988: 14; Silvey and MacKeith, 1988: 
173–174). As with the tale of the child whose Webkinz pet fell ill from his disuse of 
the game, virtual worlds can mimic the last three characteristics. However, it is on 
the first characteristic that virtual worlds fall short: the child has not imagined the 
world, and is not in control. The child may, therefore, have significant difficulties 
distinguishing the virtual world from the real one. 
Others contend that the development of the imagination is critical not only to 
our individual development but also to our collective development. Jung (1933), 
already cognizant of the pressures of our modern life, warns us not to abandon 
our species’ hard-fought accomplishments in developing our spiritual life. “The 
wheel of history,” he states, “must not be turned back, and man’s advance toward 
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a spiritual life, which began with the primitive rites of initiation, must not be 
denied” (ibid.: 125). The consequences of losing or not developing our imagina-
tive capacities can have serious and as yet unforeseen repercussions and, as Jung 
warns us, our collective accomplishments can be turned back. 
In summary, the imagination is unique to humans, and it is critical for our 
learning and for children’s proper intellectual development. It is also a key part of 
what makes us human. In addition, the imagination is a learned ability, one which 
is not yet present in young children (we can conclude from Piaget’s theory on 
make-believe play that the imagination develops along with make-believe play). It 
is originally derived from the basic senses, works on the material that is present in 
the brain and bridges the gap between the self and the object of desire, as well as 
the time from the present to the future. The development of the imagination also 
appears necessary in order to be able to distinguish between the imagined and the 
real. In children, the imagination develops and expresses in imaginative play and 
creative imagination. The emphasis is on the novel reshaping of already-familiar 
images and experiences. These skills are all essential for both understanding and 
creating stories. But the question that we wish to raise in this chapter is whether 
the images and concepts that children receive from playing in virtual worlds func-
tion as building blocks for the development of the child’s imagination in the same 
way as images and concepts derived from less artificial media. To take a simple 
example, the images a child gets from having a book read to them come from his 
or her own mind’s eye, but the images they get from watching a show on TV come 
from the creator and are imposed upon the child, crowding out the images in the 
mind’s eye the child would otherwise create. Because a virtual world is an even 
more fully-immersive experience for the child than a television show, even more 
of the images and concepts that child users receive are imposed upon them, thus 
increasing the ill effects of the medium. Below, we describe good reasons why 
we think this is the case, and why further research needs to be done in this area. 
The Development of the Imagination
Imagination is critical to children’s learning and development. Vygotsky (2004: 
11–12) states that “child’s play is not simply a reproduction of what he has experi-
enced, but a creative reworking of the impressions he has acquired. He combines 
them and uses them to construct a new reality, one that conforms to his own 
needs and desires”. When the child is rehearsing a situation from his life with toys, 
he is not only duplicating the situation in reality but is creating a scenario that 
exceeds that reality and portrays what will or may happen, according to the child’s 
fears, hopes and other internal drives. Winnicott (1971: 72–73) further states that 
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“[i]t is in playing and only in playing that the individual child or adult is able to 
be creative and to use the whole personality, and it is only in being creative that 
the individual discovers the self ”. These two steps are essential. First, imaginative 
playing will enable creativity, and only in creativity will we discover ourselves. 
While many animals engage in play, it lacks the generativity of children’s play. 
Cobb (1977: 29) contends that “while other animals do play, the human child’s 
play includes the effort to be something other than what he actually is, to ‘act 
out’ and to dramatize speculation”. Wittgenstein (1949: 37e) pondered, “Could 
one imagine a world in which there could be no pretend?”. Play is essential for 
the imagination, but it is pretend play that most deeply express and develops our 
creativity and imagination. 
According to Piaget’s (1962) influential developmental theory, there are three 
main types of children’s play that direct and foster a child’s mental development: 
practice games, symbolic games and games with rules. When a child jumps over 
a stream for the fun of jumping, she is engaging in a practice game. Games with 
rules are “games with sensory-motor combinations (races, marbles, ball games, 
etc.) or intellectual combinations (cards, chess, etc.), in which there is competition 
between individuals (otherwise rules would be useless) and which are regulated 
either by a code handed down from earlier generations, or by temporary agree-
ment” (ibid.: 142). Symbolic games imply representation of an absent object, since 
there is a comparison between a given and an imagined element. For example, a 
child pushing a box and imagining it is a car. It is the symbolic, or pretend, games 
that are most important in the context of the development of imagination.
Piaget argues that “while mere practice play begins with the first months of life 
and symbolic play during the second year, games with rules rarely occur before 
stage II (age 4–7) and belong mainly to the third period (from 7–11)” (ibid.: 142). 
Piaget theorizes that from ages 4 to 7, symbolic games begin to lose their fre-
quency, but continue to appear in the same intensity. From the age of 7 to 11 or 12, 
symbolic play declines and games with rules (social games) emerge. According to 
Piaget, symbolic play takes place mainly from about age 2 to 7. Singer and Singer 
(1990: 32) agree that “imaginative play emerges toward the end of the child’s 
second post-partum year, struggles fitfully toward a flowering well into the third 
year, and in the fourth, fifth, and sixth years is a significant factor in the child’s 
behavioral repertory”. However, they claim that while “Piaget seemed to suggest 
that imaginative play fades by the early school years as ‘operational’ thought takes 
over, we shall suggest that it is merely submerged in the interest of the changing 
demands of school decorum and other social pressures” (ibid.). In their view, it 
is not an internal psychological force that propels the shift, but external ones. We 
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posit that the use of virtual worlds may spur on this shift, making the symbolic 
play period shorter and thus impairing the process of imagination development.
Recognizing the developmental importance of the imagination, Singer & Singer 
propose that “our human stream of consciousness emerges gradually in childhood 
from children’s play and from their pretend games” (ibid.). As explained by Gross-
man & Degaetano (1999: 58): 
The brain of the child is not a miniature version of the adult brain … the young brain is 
an organ that will change considerably as it matures over the course of childhood and 
adolescence. As it builds neural structures for optimal development, the young brain is 
very vulnerable to stimulus from its environment.
Without pretend play, the imagination will not properly develop in young chil-
dren, and the literature suggests that some of the deficits created thereby may 
be life-long. We posit that another mechanism whereby virtual worlds may be 
harming this development by misleading the child’s brain to think he is engaged 
in pretend play, while he is actually engaged in a combination of practice and 
rule games. 
Cobb’s (1977) findings seem to support this proposition. She writes:
The sense of wonder is spontaneous, a prerogative of childhood. When it is maintained 
as an attitude, or a point of view, in later life, wonder permits a response of the nervous 
system to the universe that incites the mind to organize novelty of pattern and form out 
of incoming information. The ability of the adult to look upon the world with wonder 
is thus a technique and an essential instrument in the work of the poet, the artist or the 
creative thinker. (Ibid.: 27) 
The artificial medium and the mediated stimulus it sends to the senses curtail 
this sense of wonder. Instead of experiencing the world in wonder, the child is 
experiencing the virtual world where the alleged wonder is mediated, misleading, 
and masks the ‘true’ imaginary universe with the ready-made and mediated one. 
The Role of Play
The chief value of play in child development lies in the child’s total control over 
their imaginary universe, free from external constraints – an accomplishment that is 
simply not possible in the mediated virtual world. Piaget (1962: 87) argued that “[u]
nlike objective thought, which seeks to adapt itself to the requirements of external 
reality, imaginative play is a symbolic transposition which subjects things to the 
child’s activity, without rules or limitations”. Although Piaget and Vygotsky experi-
enced a theoretical controversy about the nature of imagination, there was a mutual 
understanding between them that “the symbolic game as a whole is again a practice 
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game, but a practice game which exercises (and more particularly ‘pre-exercises’) the 
specific form of thought which is imagination” (Piaget, 1962: 118). Symbolic games 
develop the imagination free from any external constrains, a freedom which is not 
possible in virtual worlds that are inherently bound to some rules.
Mitchell (2002: 4) explains that “pretense or make-believe is a mantel activ-
ity involving imagination that is intentionally projected onto something”. More 
elaborately, make-believe is “the use of … props in imaginative activities,” where 
props are “objects of imagining” (Walton, 1990: 25). Props include the pretend-
ers themselves and the objects. Pretence in play is called “symbolic play”, but 
pretending also occurs outside play, and need not be “playful”(Mitchell, 2002: 4). 
Pretence is essential for the imagination development either in play or outside it. 
But it is only possible when there are no external constraints forced on the child. 
Adults and other children might force external constrains, the same as do 
virtual worlds. The difference is that external constrains in the real world are 
obvious and apparent, while virtual worlds actually enforce external constraints, 
while pretending to provide props for imaginative play. For example, a child can 
dress its penguin in Club Penguin, which is allegedly imaginative play, but cannot 
use the penguin as a chair, i.e., the child cannot stand the penguin as a symbol for 
some other object or idea, which constitutes true imaginative play. 
Singer and Singer (1990) support the developmental value of symbolic games, 
stating that when “children engage in symbolic games they are practicing mental 
skills that will later stand them in good stead, just as practice in walking, balanc-
ing, or swimming aids the development of motor skills” (ibid.: 22). In a follow-up 
study of children from age eight to twelve, twenty years later, Shiner, et al. (2003: 
1165–1166) found that those children who scored high in social skills, academic 
attainment, and work competence maintained these patterns as adults. These 
kinds of skills are the same as those found to emerge from imaginative play in 
the earlier years (Singer & Singer, 2001: 16–20; Smilansky, 1986: 926). Therefore, 
deficits in imagination in early years are correlated with long-term deficits in 
other pro-social skills. 
Symbolic play enables children to have a clear sense of what is real and what 
is fantasy (Aronson and Golomb, 1999: 1424;). Russ conducted a study with 121 
first and second graders, and then a follow up study with 31 of them in fifth and 
sixth grade. She found that “children who play imaginatively in their early years are 
more likely to think creatively … good early play skills predicted the ability to be 
creative and generate alternative solutions to everyday problems” (Adams, 2003: 3). 
Therefore, children who substitute their imaginative play with the rule-bound play 
in virtual worlds may not fully develop these skills.
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Make-believe play produces other important outcomes. Spiegel (2008) argues 
that it develops the ability to self-regulate; Singer and Singer (1990: 10) posit that 
imaginative play is associated with more positive emotions in children. Other 
studies have shown how children engaging together in make-believe play dem-
onstrate advances in recognizing others’ thoughts, or in differentiating fantasy 
representations from reality (Rosen & Singer, 1997: 1133; Schwebel, Rosen and 
Singer, 1999: 334). Children engaged together in play in virtual worlds are not 
involved in make-believe play; rather, they are playing games with rules, but these 
are the rules set by the creators of the virtual world. 
An illustration of the negative effects of the lack of pretend play was made by 
Wulff (1985: 141), who finds that autistic children have severe early deprivations 
in symbolic play. Harris (2000: 6) states that “the study of early pathology shows 
that it is the absence of early imagination, and not its presence, that is pathologi-
cal”. He continues, stating that “[o]ne of the major characteristics of the syndrome 
of early childhood autism is an absence or impoverishment of pretend play… The 
long term social and cognitive restriction of people with autism suggest that the 
capacity for pretence is an important foundation for lifelong normality” (ibid.). 
The imagination, the ability to think symbolically, and therefore the development 
of normal cognition are all closely linked. This can clearly be seen in children who 
have serious deficits in symbolic thinking and cannot engage in symbolic or pre-
tend play, as occurs in children who are on the severe end of the autism spectrum. 
Children playing in virtual worlds might, therefore, interact with the virtual 
world as though they are engaged in make-believe play, while they are really en-
gaged in rule-bound play. We argue that this interaction with the game removes 
the benefits children would otherwise receive from their play. First, children are 
not receiving the benefits from symbolic play when they play in virtual worlds, 
and second, because they may acquire a learned deficit in the ability to distinguish 
the real world from the fantasy. 
The Creative Imagination
It should be noted that this chapter deals with the creative imagination rather than 
creativity itself. The commonalities and differences between the two are beyond 
the scope of this chapter. Singer and Singer (1990) have noted some of the dif-
ferences between the two concepts, stating that “[i]magination seems freer and 
broader, since our thoughts may remain as private and as fanciful as we may want 
them to be, with no constraints. Imagination may take the form of visual imagery 
with no obvious outcome other than the pleasure it affords us” (p. 268–269). It is 
the creative imagination in this sense that we discuss below. 
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Vygotsky saw creativity as a way of adapting to the challenges posed by our 
environment. “A creature that is perfectly adapted to its environment,” he states, 
“would not want anything, would not have anything to strive for, and, of course, 
would not be able to create anything” (ibid.: 29). Rogers (1959: 69) points out 
that, with the kaleidoscope of changes that are occurring at a geometric rate, the 
development of genuine, creative adaptation may represent the only way forward 
to build a constructive continuity As Rogers (1959) states, “[u]nless man can make 
new and original adaptations to his environment as rapidly as his science can 
change the environment, our culture will perish. Not only individual maladjust-
ment and group tensions but international annihilation will be the price we pay 
for a lack of creativity” (ibid. 70). There may be a heavy price to pay, therefore, 
if genuine creative adaptation cannot be fostered. At the same time as our real 
environment is changing rapidly, our virtual environment is changing in the op-
posite direction, becoming more and more convenient for us and adapting to our 
whims, rather than posing challenges to our creativity.
In this context, Winnicott (1971: 91) argues that “everything that happens is 
creative except in so far as the individual is ill, or is hampered by ongoing envi-
ronmental factors which stifle his creative processes”. When the child is spend-
ing time in the pre-designed environment of the virtual world, his creativity is 
stifled in this manner. Cobb (1977: 15) states that “a major clue to mental and 
psychosocial health lies in the spontaneous and innately creative imagination of 
childhood, both as form of learning and as a function of the organizing powers 
of the perceiving nervous system”. As can be seen in children with severe autism, 
the lack of symbolic thinking and the creative imagination presents itself as a 
severe cognitive pathology.
Winnicott (1971: 87) further states that “many individuals have experienced 
just enough of creative living to recognize that for most of their time they are 
living uncreatively, as if caught up in the creativity of someone else, or of a ma-
chine”. However, children have not yet experienced enough creative imagining of 
their own to realize they are “caught up in the creativity of someone else, or of a 
machine”. Vygotsky (2004) concludes that “[t]he entire future of humanity will be 
attained through the creative imagination … The development of a creative indi-
vidual, one who strives for the future, is enabled by creative imagination embodied 
in the present” (p. 88). But what if there is no “creative imagination embodied in 
the present” because of the influence of an all-encompassing virtual environment?
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The Senses
The argument that technology alters our sensory perception is not new. McLu-
han (1964) remarked on the changes in the senses as a result of the introduction 
of technology, stating that “[i]f technology is introduced from within or from 
without a culture, and if it gives new stress or ascendancy to one or another of 
our senses, the ratio among all our senses is altered. We no longer feel the same, 
nor do our eyes and ears and other senses remain the same” (ibid.: 24). Advanced 
technologies, such as virtual worlds, provide more powerful sensory output, like 
time and interaction, all of which were not present at the time of McLuhan’s writ-
ing. We ought, therefore, to think carefully about how our sensory perceptions 
are being altered by these developing virtual cultures. 
In an interview with Rudolf Arnheim (Peterson, 1972), he discusses a genera-
tion that had lost touch with its senses. Arnheim states:
If you look at television for hours every day, you must grow up with the ghostly feeling 
that you live in a world of wraiths. You see, Jim, the mind finds it hard to grasp images 
that do not have significant form, and in grasping an object the mind finds meaning 
in that object… The visual sense in most men and women has been reduced to an 
economic minimum – the effort it takes to tell that the piece of paper is not a piece of 
bread. (p. 92) … We have lost the human ability to taste the feast of meaning that each 
event and object offers to our senses. (Ibid.: 55)
The mind cannot fully develop its imagination based on sensory input coming 
from an artificial medium, and this is more so for virtual worlds than it was in 
Arnheim’s time.
Pearce (1985: 63) states that “[a]bstract imagery is not present to the senses; it 
must be created from within. We must then process that imagery, transfer it into 
images available to the senses out there. If we cannot, we have no imagination, 
and if we have no imagination we are automatically grounded in sensory-motor 
imagery”. When the mind is bombarded with sensory input from an artificial 
medium, there is no place for acquiring and manipulating abstract imagery. There 
is no creation of images from within, and therefore no imagination.
In his warning to us about the dangerous aspects of children’s exposure to 
artificial media, Latham (2003: iv) concludes that “young children’s spontaneous 
imaginative capabilities may be neurologically foreclosed and become increas-
ingly impoverished as exposure to screen-based electronic entertainment rises”. 
The internal process of imagination is replaced by the outside exposure to the arti-
ficial media. Kline (1989) summarizes this shift as one in which “marketing, rather 
than entertainment, considerations dominate the design of children’s characters, 
the fictions in which they appear, and hence the way children play” (ibid.: 311; 
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Levin & Rosenquest, 2001: 243). At the same time, “[p]lay, the most important 
modality of childhood learning is thus colonized by marketing objectives making 
the imagination the organ of corporate desire. The consumption ethos has become 
the vortex of children’s culture” (ibid. – emphasis added).
Virtual worlds may therefore pose a fundamental harm to the development 
of children’s imagination through the ways in which they distort children’s sense 
perceptions. However, the harm posed to children’s imagination by the use of 
virtual worlds is challenging in two ways: it is intangible, and there is a paucity of 
research into children’s experiences with virtual worlds.
Empirical Research on Children and the Media: The 
Visualization Hypothesis
Most, if not all, of the empirical research regarding media and the imagination 
was conducted during the 1980s and therefore focused on television. For sev-
eral reasons – undoubtedly the problem of quantifying imagination being one of 
them – this line of research has not been pursued further to other, more advanced 
artificial mediums. Therefore, we will review the existing research in this field, 
and the implications for the effects of more advanced artificial mediums will be 
drawn by analogy.
Two competing theories have been introduced regarding the effects of TV use 
on creative imagination: stimulation theory posits that TV stimulates creative im-
agination through its content; reduction theory, on the other hand, posits that TV 
hinders the development of creative imagination (Valkenburg and van der Voort, 
1994: 324–325). While five types of reduction hypotheses have been proposed 
in the literature (Salomon, 1984: 650; Singer et al. 1984), only the visualization 
hypothesis is relevant and will be discussed here. The visualization hypothesis 
posits, in essence, that the visual nature of TV is responsible for the reductive 
effect that TV has on creative imagination. Unlike verbal media, such as radio 
and print, TV presents the viewer with ready-made visual images and thus leaves 
little room for forming one’s own. When engaged in creative thinking, it is hard 
to dissociate oneself from the images supplied by TV, with the result that one has 
greater difficulty generating novel ideas and images from TV (Greenfield and 
Beagles-Ross, 1998: 74; Meline, 1976: 81; Webb, 1980: 10).
Valkenberg and van der Voort (1994: 336–337) have found some support for 
the visualization hypothesis. They reviewed a number of studies which indicated 
that children who watched a TV story more often used visual content as a basis 
for drawing story related inferences, whereas children who had heard the same 
story on a radio more often based their inferences on the verbal content, as well 
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as information from outside of the story, such as personal experience (ibid.: 332; 
see also Beagles-Ross and Gat, 1983; Greenfield and Beagles-Ross, 1988; Merin-
goff, 1980; Vibbert and Meringoff, 1981). Goldberg (1994), too, found that “[TV] 
supplies the same image to millions of people at the same time. We process those 
images rather than create them” (p. 16). Goldberg (1994) and Latham (2003) 
support this line of thinking. Latham states:
With images that are processed through the sensory system, rather than created in the 
mind’s eye, we take in what Giegerich (1985) refers to as a ‘distillation of image’ (p. 17) … 
In the case of young children, neuronal pathways are being wired and shed according to 
their use patterns. When concentrated representational electronic images are observed 
through the visual sensory system, other body and sense modalities consequently receive 
less stimulation. (Goldberg, 1994: 11–12)
Further support for the visualization hypothesis was provided by Conway and 
Siegelman (1978), who found that “[h]eavy viewing destroys the natural ability 
of children to form mental images from what they hear or read. With too much 
TV, the young child’s basic capacity of imagination, like an unused muscle, never 
reaches a level adequate for performing even the most elementary of creative 
acts” (ibid.: 191). Mander (1978), discussing the visualization hypothesis, wrote 
that “[m]ore than any other single effect, television places images in our brain. 
It is a melancholy fact that most of us give little importance to this implantation, 
perhaps because we have lost touch with our own image-creating abilities, how 
we use them and the critical functions they serve in our lives” (ibid.: 216).
This can have a negative effect on the development of creative imagination in 
children. Pearce (1992: 166) argues:
Television feeds both stimulus and response into that infant-child brain, as a single 
paired-effect, and therein lays the danger. Television floods the brain with a counterfeit 
of the response the brain is supposed to learn to make to the stimuli of words or music. As 
a result, much structural coupling between mind and environment is eliminated; few 
metaphoric images develop; few higher cortical areas of the brain are called into play; 
few, if any, symbolic structures develop.
Pearce (ibid.: 167) concludes that “failing to develop imagery means having no 
imagination”.
In their research on video game users and dreams, Gackenbach et al. (2009: 
219 found that high-end users were associated with the lucid dream type, had 
more dead and imaginary characters in their dreams (Gackenbach, 2006: 108; 
Gackenbach et al., 2009: 219), and were coded as containing more bizarre ele-
ments in their dreams (ibid, 2009: 227). Gackenbach et al. (2009b) assume that 
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dream bizarreness in high-end video game users is a result of a more developed 
creative imagination (ibid.: 228).
Similarly, a study conducted among users of the virtual world Everquest found 
that 80.6% of the female and 58.4% of the male players reported dreaming of the 
virtual world or having a dream taking place in the virtual world environment (Sma-
hel et al., 2007). However, these findings may rather indicate the deep influence of 
video games (and consequently, virtual worlds) on the user. It might be said that the 
most ‘sacred’ space of the imagination – dreams – has been ‘invaded’ by the artificial 
medium, and that this is a warning sign as to its deep and embracing influence. 
We argue that virtual worlds and virtual realities call upon us to extend the 
visualization hypothesis further – from the senses of vision and sound to higher 
psychological dimensions of perception, including of time, interaction and associ-
ated aspects as a narrative construction, and judgments concerning reality versus 
fantasy. We posit that these are weak and almost irrelevant in TV, stronger in video 
games and predominant in virtual worlds, as the user becomes more and more 
immersed in the medium, and more and more of the material is supplied for the 
user by the medium. This is the key theoretical advance that we propose in this 
chapter. Accordingly, we propose to rename this phenomenon the ‘displacement 
hypothesis’ in order to capture these new cognitive and sensory dimensions that 
are being displaced by the immersive virtual environment, and to emphasize that, 
when manufactured content is supplied ready-made to the individual, it displaces 
the creative imaginative processes that the individual would otherwise supply for 
him or herself. In children whose creative imagination is still developing, such con-
tinuous displacement could have permanent effects on the creative imagination. It is 
no longer the visual only that is displacing the images that could have been created 
by the imagination; time, space, interaction and narrative, even presence and being, 
are now being projected onto us and consumed from the artificial medium, where 
they are replacing the natural pace and creation of these mental processes within 
the person. This has much more significant effects on the individual than when only 
the visual sense is being displaced. The most internal object, the mind, is becoming 
externalized, nourishing itself falsely from the artificial medium dimensions, and 
leaving little space for the flourishing of the imagination.
Summary
This chapter has reviewed some of the extant literature on virtual worlds, particu-
larly those aimed at children, as well as the imagination and its development. We 
have noted that there is a great potential for the use of virtual worlds to harm the de-
velopment of the creative imagination in the child’s developing mind. Furthermore, 
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we posit that the likely pathway of this harm is that virtual worlds, like television, 
displace the imagination with ready-made images and narratives. Unlike television, 
however, virtual worlds further displace the child’s imaginary universe, their sense 
of reality versus fantasy, and their creative and symbolic play. They do this while 
mimicking the imaginary world that children need to create on their own terms, 
displacing this experience as well. For this reason, children experience the virtual 
world not as a construct of their imagination, over which they have control, but as 
an external reality like any other. This can give rise to serious distortions of normal 
developing cognitive processes. 
We are aware that there is little empirical research to date on the effects of vir-
tual worlds on children’s cognitive development, let alone the development of the 
creative imagination. With this review of the extant literature, and our proposed 
mechanisms for how virtual worlds disrupt children’s normal development, it is 
our hope to suggest a testable hypothesis, and generate interest in further research. 
The displacement hypothesis that we herein propose has a long provenance in the 
literature and is an extension to new media theories for which there is already 
much empirical support. Healy (1998: 17) reminds us that “[t]echnology shapes 
the growing mind. The younger the mind, the more malleable it is. The younger 
the technology, the more unproven it is”. The rapid development of new and 
untested technologies operating on younger and younger minds for longer and 
longer periods of time is in many ways itself a great experiment, and there seem to 
be good reasons to believe that it is an ill-conceived one, with potentially serious 
consequences. Until further research has been done, we conclude that children’s 
storytelling through the use of virtual worlds should not replace more traditional 
methods of storytelling that more fully engage the child’s creative, imaginative, 
and cognitive processes. 
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